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COMMUNICATIONS LAW-FCC FAIRNESS DOCTRINE PRO
CEDURES--A Complainant Runs Aground on the Commission's Pro
cedural Shoals-American Security Council Education Foundation
v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 662
(1980).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In American Security Council Education Foundation v. FCC, 1
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia de
cided that a complaining organization submitted insufficient evi
dence to prove that CBS television news stories were imbalanced.
The American Security Council Education Foundation (ASCEF) is
a nonprofit educational institution dedicated to enhancing public
awareness about this country's national security. 2 When the
ASCEF perceived that the major television networks were pre
senting "dovish" opinions during news stories concerning national
security, it commissioned an ambitious study in 1972 to confirm its
apprehension. 3 ASCEF concluded that our national security, in a
military sense, was a paramount issue and that the network's editori
alizing during the news was weakening the viewer's aware
ness of threats to our country. Although ASCEF desired to examine
all the major television networks, cost and time constraints led it to
focus on one network. CBS was chosen because it had the greatest
number of viewers and affiliated stations at that time. 4
The researchers transcribed all CBS Evening News telecasts
aired in 1972, and culled news items which fell within four topic
areas the researchers felt would be most likely to produce refer
ences to national security. The four topic areas included: "United
States military and foreign affairs; Soviet Union military and foreign
policy; China military and foreign policy; and Vietnam affairs."5
1.

American Sec. Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. CiT.

1979), cen. denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980).
2. In 1972, the American Security Council Education Foundation (ASCEF) was
known as the Institute for American Strategy. See generally F. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD
GUYS, THE BAD GUYS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 168 (1975).
3. In 1974, ASCEF published the study. E. LEFEVER, TV AND NATIONAL DE
FENSE, AN ANALYSIS OF CBS NEWS, 1972-1973 (1974), reprinted in part in American
Sec. Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 44 RAD. RE:G. 2d (P&F) 193, 216 (D.C. CiT.
1978) (appendix C), rehearing en bane, 607 F.2d 438, (D.C. r.ir. 1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 662 (1980).
4. See F. FRIENDLY, supra note 2 at 173.
5. 607 F.2d at 441-42. The topic areas included, among other things, President
Nixon's remarks and congressional debate on SALT, Administration and congres
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Each news item 6 was classified "A," "B," or "C" according to
the viewpoint which ASCEF believed CBS conveyed on national
security during its broadcasts. Viewpoint "A" indicated that a CBS
news story conveyed that the threat to the nation's security was
more serious than perceived by the governmel)t or that the United
States ought to increase its national security efforts; viewpoint "B"
indicated that a news story conveyed that the present government
threat perception was essentially correct or United States military
and foreign policy efforts were adequate; and viewpoint "C" indica
ted that a news story conveyed that the threat to United States se
curity was less serious than perceived by the government or that
United States national security efforts should be decreased. 7
Utilizing this format,8 ASCEF concluded that 3.54% of the culled
news items reflected viewpoint "A," 34.63% reflected viewpoint
"B,"9 and 61.83% reflected viewpoint "C." The researchers recog
nized that the imbalance toward viewpoint "C" was largely due to
news items dealing with the Vietnam War;10 however, when refer
ences to Vietnam were excluded, the "C" views still outnumbered
the "A" views by a ratio of three to one. l l The thrust of the study's
result, therefore, was that CBS had slanted the news to suggest that
national security should be decreased, as opposed to presenting a
neutral, unbiased report.
sional statements concerning the Trident Submarine System and the B-1 Bomber,
the Democratic Party platform on draft evader amnesty, debate over the defense
budget, Soviet presence in the Middle East, campaign statements by presidential
candidate George McGovern, United States troops in Europe, South Korea and
Indochina, President Nixon's 1972 China trip, the Vietnam War, and the activities of
Chinese school children. Id. at 442.
6. The researchers broke each news item down into sentences. From the 1,396
broadcasts of separate news items originally transcribed, 274 survived screening to
eliminate news items which, in the researchers view, did not express an opinion.
The 274 news items were comprised of 2,235 sentences and according to ASCEF,
CBS expressed its own opinion in 416 of the 2,235 sentences. Id. at 442 n.6.
7. Id. at 442.
8. The "viewpoint analysis" is similar to the three option approach used by the
Brookings Institution in analyzing the United States budget. American Sec. Council
Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 44 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 193, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rehear
ing en bane, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1979), eert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980).
9. Viewpoint "B," by the researcher's standard, is an opinion that supports the
current policy and declared objectives of the United States government. 607 F.2d at
442 n.7. Therefore, any statement made by an Administration official, regardless of
content, would fall into viewpoint "B" by default. Id.
10. American Sec. Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 44 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F)
193, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rehearing en bane, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1979), eert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980).
11. Id.
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The ASCEF study was published in 197412 and stirred consid
erable response from the press. 13 Shortly before its release,
ASCEF forwarded the study to CBS with accompanying charges of
distortion and imbalance, and requested that CBS take corrective
action to comply with the fairness doctrine. The fairness doctrine
requires a news broadcaster to present the conflicting views on an
issue and also to provide sufficient information for a viewer or lis
tener to evaluate it. 14 In 1975, CBS notified ASCEF that its news
programming was balanced, that no fairness doctrine violation ex
isted, and that no response to the complaint was necessary.1 5 Mter
updating its study by reexamining CBS news programs during seg
ments of 1975 and 197616 and concluding the imbalance was sub
stantially unchanged,17 ASCEF filed a fairness doctrine complaint
with the appropriate agency, the Federal Communications Com
mission. ASCEF requested that a reasonable opportunity be af
forded for the presentation of the viewpoint "A" consideration that
the United States ought to increase its national security efforts.1s
12. See note 3 supra.
13. American Sec. Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 44 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F)
193, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rehearing en bane, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980).
14. FCC, REPORT ON EDITORIALIZING BY BROADCAST LICENSEES, 13 F.C.C.
1246, 1249 (1949) [hereinafter cited as EDITORlALIZING REPORT]. The fairness doc
trine has its statutory roots in the public interest standard of the Communications Act
of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended by 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(f),
307(a),(d), & 309(a) (1976). In 1949, the Commission clearly annunciated its position
on licensee fairness obligations with respect to news, commentary, and opinion.
EDITORlALIZING REPORT, 13 F.C.C. at 1246. In 1959, Congress recognized that the
fairness doctrine was part of the public interest standard by amending the "equal
time" provision of the statute to include:
Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broad
casters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews,
news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the ob
ligation imposed upon them under this Chapter to operate in the public in
terest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting
views on issues of public importance.
Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 274, § 1, 73 Stat. 557 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)
(1976)). There is substantial disagreement over precisely when the fairness doctrine
gelled into a cohesive mandate. See Simmons, Fairness Doctrine: The Early History,
29 FED. COM. B. J. 207, 242-44 (1976).
15. American Sec. Council Educ. Foundation V. FCC, 44 HAD. REG. 2d (P&F)
193, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rehearing en bane, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980).
16. 607 F.2d at 442.
17. Id. at 442.
18. ASCEF specifically asked the Commission to order CBS to provide a rea
sonable opportunity for ASCEF to present the viewpoints that the Soviet Union is
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The Commission ruled against ASCEF in 1977,19 declaring
that ASCEF had not presented prima facie evidence of a violation.
A fairness doctrine complainant must present prima facie evidence
of a violation before the Commission will demand a response to the
complaint from the broadcaster. The Commission discerned that
the issue of national security encompassed too many subjects to be
a particular, well-defined issue. 2o Regarding the classification of
news items into one of the three viewpoint codes, the Commission
could find no explanation for the arbitrary assignment of some
news items into particular viewpoint codes. 21 The Commission fur
ther decided that ASCEF should have examined all of CBS' non
entertainment programming, such as news programs, documenta
ries, panel discussions, and the like in order to meet the prima
facie requirement of showing imbalance in CBS' overall
programming. 22
A three judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia reversed the Commission. 23 They held
that the Commission abused its discretion in rejecting the ASCEF
complaint because they found the issue of national security to be
singular, precisely formulated, and explicit. 24 According to the
panel, the issue was "as plain as day: whether this nation should do
more, less or the same about perceived threats to its national secu
rity. "25 The panel further held that the Commission's detailed evi
dentiary challenge of ASCEF's methodology and the probativeness
of some particular examples was inappropriate at the prima facie
stage of the proceedings. 26 Additionally, the panel determined that
requiring ASCEF to evaluate all of CBS' nonentertainment pro
gramming was not required by the prima facie evidence require
ment. 27
militarily superior to the United States, The Soviet Union should not be militarily
superior and that the Soviet Union still has world domination as its objective. [d. at
443 n.ll.
19. American Sec. Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 63 F.C.C. 2d 366 (1977),
afi'd, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1979), eert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980).
20. [d. at 368.
21. [d. at 368-69.
22. [d. at 369.
23. American Sec. Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 44 RAn. REG. 2d (P&F)
193, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rehearing en bane, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1979), eert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980).
24. [d. at 204.
25. Id. at 203 (emphasis in original).
26. Id. at 207.
27. Id. at 209.
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Other members of the court of appeals who were not among
the panel felt that the panel had been inattentive to considering
the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press considera
tions. 28 The court granted a rehearing en banco In a six to three
decision, the court affirmed the Commission's original decision to
dismiss the complaint. 29 In the court's determination, the issue of
national security was to vague to meet the Commission's prima
facie requirement of a specific, well-defined issue. 3o The sub-issues
ASCEF chose to comprise the "umbrella" issue of national security
were too tangential to one another for an average viewer to realize
the nexus among them. 31 In reaching its decision, the court rea
soned that to reach a contrary result would unduly burden broad
casters without a countervailing benefit to the public's right to be
informed. 32 After the en banc decision by the court of appeals,
ASCEF filed a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court. CertiDrari was denied in late 1979. 33
Although the ASCEF complaint was ruled invalid, its treat
ment by the Commission and the court of appeals offers definitive
guidance in answering the question of whether a given,
methodologically sound fairness doctrine complaint involving a
large, multifaceted issue could ever survive the prima facie evi
dence requirement. The decision offers express, procedural guid
ance for future complainants;34 but more importantly, the decision
vividly illustrates the sensitivity of the Commission's procedures to
the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press. 35
II.

BACKGROUND

Governmental regulation of broadcasting has been questioned
because it can potentially infringe on traditional first amendment
rights enjoyed by the press. Nevertheless, the government has
supported its ability to regulate broadcast news by arguing that
there is a scarcity of frequencies available for broadcasting. No one,
therefore, should be able to monopolize the airwaves because the

607 F.2d at 453 (Wright, C.J., concurring).
29. ld. at 438.
30. ld. at 448.
31. ld. at 449.
32. ld. at 448.
33. 100 S. Ct. 662 (1979).
34. See text accompanying notes 53-65 infra.
35. See text accompanying notes 66-80 infra.

28.
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scarcity of frequencies obligates broadcasters to utilize their facili
ties as public trustees. 36
In its 1949 Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 37
the Federal Communications Commission declared that it was the
paramount right of the public to be informed and to have pres
ented to it for acceptance or rejection the different attitudes and
viewpoints concerning controversial issues. 38 The fairness doctrine
effectively ensures that the right of the public to be fully informed
is paramount to the right of government officials, broadcasters, or
individuals to broadcast their own views to influence public opin
ion. 39 In achieving its goal, the fairness doctrine imposes a two-fold
obligation on broadcasters. A broadcaster must devote a reasonable
percentage of time to coverage of controversial issues of public im
portance, and must also provide a reasonable opportunity for the
presentation of conflicting views on such issues. 4o
The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the fairness doctrine in 1969, despite its abridgement of the tra
ditional first amendment rights enjoyed by the press. In Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 41 the Court ruled that the "personal at
tack" and "political editorial" components of the fairness doctrine
were constitutional because they furthered the paramount first
amendment right of viewers to receive suitable access to ideas and
experience. 42

36. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Supreme
Court declared:
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Govern
ment from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to
conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those
views and voices which are representative of his community and which
would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.
Id. at 389. See also Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425
F.2d 543, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
37. EDITORIALIZING REPORT, supra note 14.
38. Id. at 1249.
39. See note 14 supra.
40. FCC, FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARDS, FAIRNESS
REPORT REGARDING HANDLING OF PUBLIC ISSUES, 39 Fed. Reg. 26,372, 26,374
(1974) [hereinafter cited as FAIRNESS REPORT]. See generally FCC, ApPLICABILITY
OF THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IN THE HANDLING OF CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES OF
PUBLIC IMPORTANCE, 29 Fed. Reg. 10,415 (1964) [hereinafter cited as FAIRNESS
PRIMER].
41. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
42. Id. at 373-75, 389-90. The Commission's current personal attack and politi
cal editorial rules appear at 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1979). See generally Simmons, The
FCC's Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules Reconsidered, 125 U. PA. L.
REV. 990 (1977).
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The Court, however, recognized that overly ambitious en
forcement of the fairness doctrine could lead broadcasters to re
duce their coverage of controversial public issues, or to cover those
issues blandly in an attempt to avoid fairness complaints. 43 The
Court believed that the danger was speculative at the time, but
warned that the constitutional implications of the fairness doctrine
would be reconsidered if the doctrine, in practice, reduced rather
than enhanced the volume and quality of the coverage of public is
sues. 44 In order to avoid this chilling effect, the Commission ad
ministers the fairness doctrine with restraint and has developed de
manding procedural requirements for fairness doctrine com
plainants. 45
Under Commission procedures, a fairness doctrine complain
ant must present prima facie evidence of a fairness doctrine viola
tion. 46 Generally, prima facie evidence "consists of specific factual

43.

395 U.S. at 393.

44. Id.
45. In a parallel argument, in recent years the fundamental justification for the
fairness doctrine, the scarcity of frequencies, has brought the doctrine into renewed
debate because modem advances in television broadcasting allow transmission with
out frequencies by cable. See generally M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE (1979); S.
RIVKIN, A NEW GUIDE To FEDERAL CABLE TELEVISION REGULATION (1978);
Rosenfeld, The Jurisprudence of Fairness: Freedom Through Regulation in the
Marketplace of Ideas, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 877, 885-87 (1976).
46. The prima facie evidence requirement is enumerated in several Commis
sion reports. The FAIRNESS PRIMER, supra note 40, provides that a complainant
should submit specific facts to show:
(1) the particular station involved; (2) the particular issue of a controver
sial nature discussed over the air; (3) the date and time when the program
was carried; (4) the basis for the claim that the station has presented only
one side of the question; and (5) whether the station had afforded, or has
plans to afford, an opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints.
Id. at 10,416 (footnote omitted). The prima facie evidence requirement is stated
slightly differently in the FCC, BROADCAST PROCEDURE MANUAL, 39 Fed. Reg.
32,288 (1974) [hereinafter cited as BROADCAST PROCEDURE MANUAL]:
The complaint should contain specific information concerning the fol
lowing matters: (1) The name of the station or network involved; (2) the con
troversial issue of public importance on which a view was presented; (3)
the date and time of its broadcast; (4) the basis for your claim that the issue
is controversial and of public importance; (5) an accurate summary of the
view [or] views broadcast; (6) the basis for your claim that the station or net
work has not broadcast contrasting views on the issue or issues in its overall
programming; and (7) whether the station or network has afforded, or has ex
pressed the intention to afford, a reasonable opportunity for the presentation
of contrasting viewpoints on that issue.
Id. 1/12.14, at 32,290 (emphasis added). See also FAIRNESS REPORT, supra note 40, at
26,374; FCC, THE HANDLING OF PUBLIC ISSUES UNDER THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
AND THE PUBLIC INTERESTS STANDARDS OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT, RECON
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information which, in the absence of rebuttal, is sufficient to show
that a fairness doctrine violation exists. "47 Specifically, the Com
mission has defined prima facie evidence to include "[t]he particu
lar issue of a controversial nature discussed over the air [,] . . . the
basis for the claim that the station has presented only one side of
the question [,] . . . and whether the station had afforded, or has
plans to afford, an opportunity for the presentation of contrasting
viewpoints. "48 A broadcaster will not be required to respond to a
SIDERATION OF THE FAIRNESS REPORT, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 696 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as RECONSIDERATION OF THE FAIRNESS REPORT].
47. In general tenns, prima facie evidence is a minimum quantity; that which
is enough to raise a presumption of fact or is sufficient if not rebutted to establish
the fact. Otis & Co. v. SEC, 176 F.2d 34, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1949). The District of Colum
bia Court of Appeals has described the prima facie evidence requirements for peti
tions to deny broadcast licenses under 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1976) in Columbia Broad
casting Coalition v. FCC, 505 F.2d 320, 323-24, 326-30 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Stone v.
FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 321-22, 328-30 (D.C. Cir. 1972); WLVA, Inc. v. FCC, 459 F.2d
1286, 1293-94, 1297-98, (D.C. Cir. 1972); and Folkways Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
375 F.2d 299,302-05,308-10 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Tamm, J., dissenting).
48. See note 46 supra. Most disputes arising under the Commission's prima
facie evidence requirement have centered on whether the complainant submitted
sufficient information to show: (1) that a particular issue was expressly raised in chal
lenged programming, see e.g., In re Bernard T. Callan, 30 F.C.C.2d 758 (1971) (pro
grams about a famous adoption case did not raise the issue of adoption); In re Na
tional Broadcasting Co., 25 F.C.C.2d 735 (1970) (NBC News segment about air
traffic danger did not raise the issue of private pilot competency); (2) that an issue is
a controversial issue of public importance, see e.g., In re Christopher S. Riley, 53
F.C.C.2d 190 (1975) (electronic speech compression is not an issue which is contro
versial and of public importance); In re Morton Schwartz, 52 F.C.C.2d 596 (1975)
(theory of curved space not an issue that is controversial and of public importance);
In're The Clarin, 28 F.C.C.2d 313 (1971) (bullfighting in Spain not a controversial is
sue of public importance); But see In re Accuracy in Media, Inc., 39 F.C.C.2d 416
(1973), afI'd, 521 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976) (sex
education in public schools was an issue of public importance); In re Accuracy in
Media, Inc., 39 F.C.C.2d 558 (1973) (Vietnam war a controversial issue of public im
portance); Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 1 F.C.C. 1484 (1965) (racial integration an
issue that is controversial and of public importance); and (3) that a broadcaster has
presented only one side of the issue in its overall programming. See e.g., In re Jo
seph A. O'Connor, 59 F.C.C.2d 605 (1976) (abortion); In re Dale Pontius, 46
F.C.C.2d 1118 (1974) (impeachment of President Nixon); In re Horace P. Rowley, 39
F.C.C.2d 437 (1973) (bombing and mining North Vietnam). For an excellent treat
ment of the problems involved in isolating a fairness doctrine issue and determining
if it is controversial and of public importance, see In re Accuracy in Media, Inc., 40
F.C.C.2d 958 (1973), application for review denied, 44 F.C.C.2d lO27 (1974), rev'd
sub nom. National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, reversal vacated and re
hearing en banc granted, 516 F.2d 1156, second reversal vacated as moot and re
manded with direction to vacate initial order and dismiss complaint, 516 F.2d 1180
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (dealing with the issue of pensions). See generally Simmons, The
Problem of "Issue" in the Administration of the Fairness Doctrine, 65 CAL. L. REV.
546 (1977).
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complaint which does not meet the prima facie evidence require
ment because the requirement is "part of the delicate balance
allocating burdens between licensees and complainants. "49 The
Commission reasons that broadcasters would be unduly burdened
by having to disprove allegations by reviewing their overall
programming before a complainant submits sufficient evidence to
convince the Commission that a violation of the fairness doctrine
probably exists. 50
The prima facie burden is extremely difficult to surmount. In
fiscal year 1973, for example, the Commission received approxi
mately 2,400 fairness complaints and summarily rejected 2,306 of
them for failure to state prima facie evidence of a violation. 51 Dur
ing 1973 and 1974, the Commission received 4,280 formal com
plaints, but only a handful of complaints involving news imbalance
resulted in any finding adverse to the broadcaster. 52
The ASCEF opinion provides guidance as to how the Commis
sion and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co
lumbia interpret the prima facie burden. While examining the rea
sons why the ASCEF failed to hurdle the prima facie burden, it
must be asked whether a claim as pervasive as the one ASCEF
attempted could ever satisfy the primafacie requirement.
III.

VIABLE COMPLAINTS SURVIVING FCC PROCEDURES

The ASCEF decision proVides guidance to future fairness doc
trine complainants, both in terms of how the Commission inter
prets the prima facie burden and in terms of the underlying consti
tutional purpose of the prima facie evidence requirement. ASCEF
did not meet the threshold burden of presenting prima facie evi
49. RECONSIDERATION OF THE FAIRNESS REPORT, supra note 46, at 696.
50. The Commission further elaborated in In re Allen C. Phelps, 21 F.C.C.2d
12 (1969):
Absent detailed and specific evidence of failure to comply with the re
quirements of the fairness doctrine, it would be unreasonable to require li
censees specifically to disprove allegations.... The Commission's policy of
encouraging robust, wide-open debate on issues of public importance would
in practice be defeated if, on the basis of vague and general charges of un
fairness, we should impose upon licensees the burden of proving the con
trary 'by producing recordings or transcripts of all news programs, editorials,
commentaries, and discussion of public issues, many of which are treated
over long periods of time.
Id. at 13.
51. FAIRNESS REPORT, supra note 40 at 26,375.
52. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 25, American Sec. Council Educ. Founda
tion v. FCC, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980) (No. 79-515).
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dence of a violation, and its lack of success can be described
procedurally and constitutionally.
A.

Overcoming the Procedural Prima Facie Burden

After the ASCEF decision, a complaint alleging programming
imbalance over a large, multifaceted issue will be immediately at
tacked on specificity grounds. 53 In ASCEF, the court of appeals
held that the sub-issues comprising national security were too tan
gential to one another for an average viewer to comprehend that a
statement on one sub-issue would necessarily support or contradict
a view on another. 54 For example, an average viewer would not
necessarily relate a news story about the Russian position on the
SALT II treaty to a story about the United States' posture in south
east Asia, and yet both topics concern our national security. Na
tional security, however, embraces countless topics upon which
reasonable persons differ. National security becomes vague because
the term is open to subjective construction based upon those topics
a person feels are significant. Although the court expressly disa
vowed that a fairness complaint issue may never be based on iden
tifiable sub-issues,55 it held that the sub-issues chosen by ASCEF
failed the specificity requirements of the prima facie evidence re
quirement.
With the benefit of hindsight, ASCEF apparently should have
initiated at least four separate complaints, each based upon one of
the four topic areas the foundation selected. Such a piece-meal at
tack would have delimited the Commission's attention to those sep
arate topic areas 56 and thereby lessened the conflicts in logic and
understanding when the sub-issues within each topic area were ex
amined for interrelation. In other words, if ASCEF had based its

53. Before the ASCEF decision, the Commission had rarely dismissed a fair
ness complaint on grounds of specificity. See, e.g., In re Hakki S. Tamimie, 42
F.C.C.2d 876, 877 (1973) (complaint was inadequate when it defined the issue to be
the "Middle East" and failed to specify the particular aspect of it). On occasion, the
Commission has been extremely adroit in extracting sub-issues from complaints
which would have otherwise been too generalized. See, e.g., In re Accuracy in Me
dia, Inc., 39 F.C.C.2d 416 (1973), afl'd, 521 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (FCC created
sub-issues voluntarily); In re Council on Children Media & Merchandising v. ABC,
59 F.C.C.2d 448 (1976) (FCC created sub-issues voluntarily); Green v. FCC, 447
F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals considered the com
plaint on each of the five possible constructions of the fairness issue).
54. 607 F.2d at 448.
55. Id. at 449.
56. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
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complaint on the perceived military threat from the Soviet Union
or China rather than on the general and inexplicit term "national
security," the broadcaster would be in a better position to identify
and reply to that specific issue's presentation. Chief Judge Wright,
in his ASCEF concurrence, believed that a study such as the one
undertaken by ASCEF could succeed if, in terms of specificity
alone, the study was "structured around a highly specific issue, one
that can be defined with precision and can be addressed and re
sponded to directly and efficiently by the broadcaster. "57 As an ex
ample, the issue of inflation is as pervasive as the issue of national
security. Yet the causes and cures of inflation are in great contro
versy. If a complainant believed that a broadcaster was advocating
a slanted position on a potential cause or cure of inflation, and the
complainant decided to base the complaint on inflation, he would
probably not survive the prima facie burden of specificity. After
ASCEF, such a complainant would be well advised to break down
the issue of inflation into various components, such as excess de
mand over supply, OPEC prices, excess money supply, and so
forth.
The court of appeals turned from the requirement of a specific
issue to focus on the objectivity of the study. The majority said that
the data obtained in ASCEF's study could not be subjected to
the aritficial categorization involved in a "viewpoint analysis. "58
ASCEF channeled its culled news items into three mutually exclu
sive categories: The United States should increase its national secu
rity efforts; the government's perception about national security
was essentially correct; or the United States should decrease its na
tional security efforts. As Chief Judge Wright expressed the prob
lem: "If petitioner's world is populated by 'hawks,' 'sparrows,' and
'doves,' the real world, as I understand it, is an aviary of inexhaust
ible variety. "59 In other words, although the "hawks" and "doves"
represent the polar limits of the issue of national security, there
are many positions between the two poles other than the govern
ment's point of view. During the ASCEF study, the Nixon Admin
istration mayor may not have represented the correct perception
of national security.
57. 607 F.2d at 458 (Wright, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Wright, however,
warned that the specific issue must also meet the test of being controversial and of
public importance. Id. at 458 n.46.
58. Chief Judge Wright characterized the viewpoint analysis as "gross
reductionism." Id. at 455.
59. Id. at 455 (Wright, C.J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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It is nearly impossible to imagine a methodology in a large
scale study whereby the data are not codified in some manner.
Raw data obtained in an extensive study must somehow be re
duced and interpreted through some methodology. ASCEF's
"viewpoint analysis" proved inadequate for fairness doctrine pur
poses. Perhaps it could have expanded its three categories of view
points to accommodate the "aviary" of views that lies between the
poles of "hawks" and "doves." Whatever methodology is used, a fu
ture complainant must strive for true objectivity in the presenta
tion of the specific issue and the quantitative indicia employed to
evaluate the issue.
In addition to the prima facie requirements of specificity and
objective methodology, the prima facie burden also requires that a
complainant demonstrate that the alleged imbalanced broadcast is
not cured by the broadcaster's overall programming effort.60 Al
though the court of appeals in the en bane decision did not dwell
on this aspect of the prima facie burden, the original court of ap
peals panel decision emphasized the difficulty a complainant faces
in this regard. 61 The Commission argued before the panel that
ASCEF had studied only selected news programs aired by CBS;
and, therefore, the complaint was but a generalized and
unsupported attack. 62 Further, the Commission faulted ASCEF for
its failure to evaluate CBS in its "overall news, public affairs, and
nonentertainment programming. "63 In its 1974 Fairness Report, 64
the Commission proffered a narrow and reasonable interpretation
of this aspect of the prima facie burden. The Fairness Report does
not require a complainant to monitor a station twenty-four hours a
day, seven days a week. It merely requires that a complainant be a
"regular viewer."65 The Commission's rationale in ASCEF, how
60.

See text accompanying note 48 supra.
61. American Sec. Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 44 RAn. REG. 2d (P&F)
193, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rehearing en bane, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980).
62. Id.
63.
64.
65.

Brief for FCC at 28.
FAIRNESS REPORT, supra note 40.
Specifically, the FAIRNESS REPORT, supra note 40 provides:
[The Phelps doctrine] does not require, as some appear to believe, that
the complainant constantly monitor the station .... While the complainant
must state the basis for this claim that the station has not presented con
trasting views, that claim might be based on an assertion that the complain
ant is a regular listener or viewer; that is, a person who consistently or as a
matter of routine listens to the news, public affairs and other non
entertainment programs carried by the station involved. This does not re
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ever, was that since ASCEF's issue was so pervasive, it should
have evaluated a correspondingly pervasive amount of
programming. The lesson in this regard is that a future complain
ant disputing a broadcaster's coverage of a large issue would be
prudent to evaluate all of a broadcaster's nonentertainment
programming.
In short, future fairness doctrine complainants perturbed
about a broadcaster's presentation of a large, multifaceted issue
should follow the guidance provided by the court of appeals. The
future complainant must precisely narrow the issue involved in or
der for a broadcaster to identify why the complainant argues that
there was a slanted presentation of an issue. The broadcaster then
will fully understand the basis of the complaint and will be able to
respond accordingly. Secondly, the complainant must choose a
methodology which will objectively evaluate and interpret the raw
data obtained in a study. In addition, the complainant involved
with a large, pervasive issue should evaluate all of the broadcaster's
nonentertainment programming.

B.

Constitutional Guidance to the Prima Facie Burden

Were a fairness doctrine complainant to proffer an overwhelm
ingly specific and methodologically sound complaint, together with
accompanying proof of overall programming imbalance, the prima
facie burden would still lie before the complainant. The Commis
sion's procedural prima facie burden only can he overcome when
the viewer or listener's right to receive unbiased news outweighs
the broadcaster's first amendment right to be unhindered in the
transmission of its news.
The constitutional basis of the burden is embodied in the dis
tinction between the first amendment rights afforded broadcasters,
as they have evolved to date, and the traditional first amendment
rights afforded newspapers.66 In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo,67 a 1973 case in which the United States Supreme Court
overturned a Florida statute which required newspapers to print
quire that the complainant listen to or view the station 24 hours a day, seven
days a week. One example of a 'regular' television viewer would be a per
son who routinely (but not necessarily every day) watches the evening news
and a significant portion of the public affairs programs of a given station.
FAIRNESS REPORT, supra note 40, at 26,379 (emphasis added).
66. See generally F. FRIENDLY, supra note 2; Comment, The Regulation of

Competing First Amendment Rights: A New Fairness Doctrine Balance After CBS,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 1283, (1974).
67.

418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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editorial replies, the Court stated that the choice of material to go
into newspapers and the treatment of public issues in newspapers,
whether fair or unfair, constitute the exercise of editorial control
and judgment. 68 The Court then said: "It has yet to be demon
strated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be
exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free
press as they have evolved to this time. "69 Contrast that philoso
phy with the Court's opinion in Red Lion,70 the 1969 case in which
the Court upheld the fairness doctrine against a constitutional chal
lenge. The Court said that Congress and the Commission do not
violate the first amendment when they require a radio or television
station to give reply time to redress a slanted presentation of an
issue. 71
The Court's constitutional emphasis in Tornillo was the news
paper's right not to be regulated in the publication of its views. In
Red Lion, the Court was more concerned with the public's right to
receive unbiased news than it was with the broadcaster's first
amendment right to transmit its views. The Red Lion Court
justified the distinction between the first amendment rights af
forded broadcasters and newspapers on the technological scarcity of
broadcasting frequencies. 72 Despite that justification, the fact re
mains that in order to protect the rights of viewers and listeners,
the Court and Congress have placed restrictions on broadcasters
which do not coincide with the spirit of a free press. The Red Lion
Court warned that the constitutional implications of the restrictions
on broadcasters caused by the fairness doctrine would be reconsid
ered if, in practice, the doctrine chilled the coverage of public is
sues. 73 The Commission's prima facie evidence requirement
procedurally accomplishes the constitutional goal of guaranteeing
unbiased news to viewers without unduly burdening broadcasters
because the requirement effectively screens out all but the most
compelling violations of the fairness doctrine. In light of potential
infringements on the first amendment rights of broadcasters, as
exemplified by their having to defend themselves continually
against unsubstantiated complaints, the Commission and the courts
68.

[d. at 258 (footnote omitted).

69. [d.
70.
71.
72.
73.

395 U.S. 367 (1969).
[d. at 396.
[d. at 400; see text accompanying note 36 supra.
395 U.S. at 393.
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will continue their "partnership"74 in enforcing the fairness doc
trine with great restraint.
The ASCEF decision should have rested solely on the proce
dural ground of whether ASCEF had met the threshold burden of
presenting prima facie evidence of a fairness doctrine violation.
The controversy, on its face, presented no constitutional issues, yet
the court determined that ASCEF had not met the procedural
prima facie burden by factoring into its holding the constitutional
interests of the viewing public and the broadcaster. The court in
corporated constitutional criteria into its procedural ruling when
the majority declared that the complaint had not met the prima
facie procedural burden because national security was too
imprecise to be a fairness doctrine issue and that "a contrary result
would unduly burden broadcasters without a countervailing benefit
to the public's right to be informed. "75 To say that a complainant
has not met the prima facie burden because a contrary result
would unduly burden broadcasters is a constitutional holding, not a
procedural one. 76 Nowhere in the Commission's published defini
tions of the prima facie evidence requirement is it specified that
part of the complainant's showing includes demonstrating the lack
of undue burden on the broadcaster.77 The ASCEF constitutional
holding infuses the prima facie burden with first amendment crite
ria which allows the Commission to balance the broadcaster's bur
den of responding to a complaint with a large-scale complainant's
burden of making a prima facie showing. Such criteria escalate the
complainant's prima facie burden beyond mere procedure.

74. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has used this word several times in re
viewing Commission rulings. See e.g., WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838
(D.C. Cir. 1979); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52
(D.C. Cir. 1970). That court has often stated that its role in reviewing Commission
decisions will be limited and deferential. See, e.g., Lakewood Broadcasting Serv.,
Inc. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 919, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Citizens to Keep Progressive Rock v.
FCC, 478 F.2d 926, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Office of Communication of United Church
of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1005-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (FCC is afforded broad dis
cretion in formulating rules governing public intervention). See also Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. Inc., v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), when the Su
preme Court stated: That is not to say we "defer" to the judgment of the Congress
and the Commission on a constitutional question, or that we would hesitate to
invoke the Constitution should we detennine that the Commission has not fulfilled
its task with appropriate sensitivity to the interests in free expression. [d. at 103.
75. 607 F.2d at 448.
76. [d. at 463 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
77. See note 48 supra.
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The three dissenting judges in ASCEF took exception to what
they deemed the majority's conversion of the prima facie evidence
requirement into an open ended "prudential" doctrine whereby
the Commission could decline jurisdiction in hard cases. 78 The dis
senters added: "The tone and rationale of the majority opinion sug
gest that the wagons are being drawn about the fairness doctrineifi
a fashion assured to deflect the most worrisome fairness com
plaints-those, like petitioner's, alleging pervasive and continuous
imbalance in the coverage of controversial matters. "79
The court, however, has not acted as dramatically as the dis
senters suggest. The prima facie burden has always been imbued
with first amendment sensitivity to broadcasters, but heretofore
under the guise of discretion. The discretion afforded the Commis
sion to veto complaints, regardless of the basis for that discretion,
is necessary to counterbalance the dilatory constitutional restric
tions the fairness doctrine imposes on broadcasters.80 Although
complainants could assert that the constitutional implications in the
prima facie burden require them to win their case before they ar
gue it,81 it is constitutionally sound to vest the decision to validate

607 F.2d at 460 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
79. ld. at 463 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
80. See note 75 supra. See generally Rosenfeld, supra note 45. The Commis
sion's regulatory scheme is centered around its determination that broadcasters
should have maximum editorial discretion in deciding how to fulfill fairness doctrine
obligations. FAIRNESS REPORT, supra note 40, at 26,374. In Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1972), the Supreme Court stated:
Balancing the various First Amendment interests involved in the broad
cast media and determining what best serves the public's right to be informed
is a task of a great delicacy and difficulty. The process must necessarily be
undertaken within the framework of the regulatory scheme that has evolved
over the course of the past half century. For, during that time, Congress and
its chosen regulatory agency have established a delicately balanced system
of regulation intended to serve the interests of all concerned .... Thus, in
evaluating the First Amendment claims of [complainants], we must afford
great weight to the decisions of Congress and the experience of the Com
mission.
ld. at 102.
81. The effect the ASCEF decision will have on potential complainants will be
important because the Commission relies upon viewer-initiated complaints to avoid
charges of direct governmental regulation. ASCEF invested over half a million dol
lars in its study and legal odyssey, and aside from the publicity they generated, they
were manifestly unsuccessful in the courts. Certainly this decision will have some
palling effect on future complainants. See, e.g., BROADCAST PROCEDURE MANUAL,
supra note 46 at 32,290. For a discussion on the role of citizens' group action as an
alternative to governmental regulation see Padden, The Emerging Role of Citizens'
Groups in Broadcast Regulation, 25 FED. COM. B. .T. 82 (1972); Comment, Enforcing
78.
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complaints with the Commission, rather than the complainants. It
is undesirable for an independent organization like ASCEF to be
able to influence broadcasting content when the same influence
would be constitutionally repugnant if a newspaper was involved.
By granting the Commission the ability to balance the burden to a
broadcaster in responding to a complaint along with the already re
strictive prima facie evidence requirement, the court of appeals has
acted in a constitutionally correct manner. Although ASCEF may
have indirectly influenced the broadcaster by its well publicized
study, the prima facie burden, as a constitutional "check valve,"
prevented ASCEF from procedurally accomplishing what was con
stitutionally unmerited.
To account for the constitutional aspect of the prima facie bur
den, and to overcome it, a future large-scale complainant must
stress that the right of the viewer or listener to receive unbiased
news has been abridged to a greater extent than the broadcaster's
first amendment rights would be in responding to the complaint.
In Red Lion terms, the complainants, through the validity of their
charge of imbalance and through the quality of their research, must
show that "it is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right
of broadcasters, which is paramount. "82
The statistics of unsuccessful complainants demonstrate that
the constitutional hurdle of the prima facie evidence requirement
is extremely difficult to surmount. In analyzing the underlying con
stitutional contradictions of the fairness doctrine as it pertains to
broadcasters and newspapers, however, it is clear that the constitu
tional aspect of the prima facie burden should screen out all but
the most obvious and flagrant violations of the fairness doctrine.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A future fairness doctrine complainant involved with a large,
multifaceted issue should break down the issue into components
which would survive a specificity attack. The complainant should
also strive for true objectivity in the research and evaluation of all
of a broadcaster's nonentertainment programming. Although a fu
ture oomplainant should note the procedural guidance offered by
ASCEF, he or she should be aware that the prima facie burden is a
manifestation of the Commission's awareness of the potential first
the Obligation To Present Controversial Issues: The Forgotten Half of the Fairness
Doctrine, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 137, 158-78 (1975).
82. 395 U.S. at 390.
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amendment infringement that the fairness doctrine presents to
broadcasters. As a constitutional "check valve," the Commission's
prima facie burden screens out all but the most merited complaints
to avoid an undue burden on the broadcaster. No matter how
procedurally viable a complaint might be, if it does not demon
strate that the viewer's right to unbiased news has been abridged
more than the broadcaster's rights would be in responding to the
complaint, then it will be unsuccessful.
Whom then does the fairness doctrine serve? The broadcasters
present a forceful first amendment argument that the fairness doc
trine is deleterious to their news organizations. ASCEF, as a con
cerned viewer, can now join the long line of unsuccessful com
plainants who could argue that the fairness doctrine does not serve
them. If the viewing or listening public is constitutionally served
by the fairness doctrine, it is because procedures developed by the
Commission, such as the prima facie evidence requirement, ensure
that the fairness doctrine is enforced with great restraint.
James T. Shaw

